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Is the tendency to morally prioritize humans over animals weaker in children than 
adults? In two pre-registered studies (N = 622), 5- to 9-year-old children and adults 
were presented with moral dilemmas pitting varying numbers of humans against 
varying numbers of either dogs or pigs and were asked who should be saved. In both 
studies, children had a weaker tendency to prioritize humans over animals than adults. 
They often chose to save multiple dogs over one human, and many valued the life of 
a dog as much as the life of a human. While they valued pigs less, the majority still 
prioritized ten pigs over one human. By contrast, almost all adults chose to save one 
human over even one hundred dogs or pigs. Our findings suggest that the common 
view that humans are far more morally important than animals appears late in 
development and is likely socially acquired. 
 







Statement of relevance  
People everywhere tend to care about and value humans more than nonhuman 
animals. In two studies, we explored whether this “speciesist” attitude is present 
even in young children. To find out, we asked 5- to 9-year-olds and adults whether 
they would choose to save the lives of humans or of dogs and pigs. As expected, 
most adults were highly “speciesist,” choosing to save one human over even one 
hundred dogs or pigs. But surprisingly, children lacked this pro-human bias. Many 
children seemed to value the life of a dog as much as the life of a human and chose 
to save ten pigs over one person. These findings clash with the view held by many 
philosophers and psychologists, that children have an initially narrow “moral circle” 
that they gradually expand over development. Instead, they suggest that the 
perspective that humans are morally special is a socially acquired ideology. It may 























  Almost everyone cares much more about humans than about non-human 
animals. Across cultures and throughout history, we use animals for food, clothing 
products, medical experimentation, and entertainment, and we are often indifferent to 
their suffering.   
Psychological research suggests that these common attitudes and practices are 
linked to the belief that humans matter far more than non-human animals (Amiot & 
Bastian, 2017; Caviola et al., 2019; Dhont et al., 2016). For example, in moral 
dilemmas in which the lives of humans are pitted against the lives of animals, adults 
consistently prioritize humans over even large numbers of animals (Awad et al., 2018; 
Petrinovich et al., 1993; Topolski et al., 2013). A recent large-scale study of moral 
dilemmas involving autonomous cars found that one of the two strongest global 
preferences is to prioritize saving human lives over those of animals (the other is to 
save the greater number) (Awad et al., 2018). Another study found that we are less 
empathic and compassionate towards creatures that are more evolutionarily distant 
from humans (Miralles et al., 2019).  
There are many reasons why people might favor humans over animals. Humans 
are typically more intelligent, more socially embedded, and are perceived as having a 
greater capacity to suffer (Caviola et al., 2019). Alternatively, people might prioritize 
humans over animals simply because of species-membership—they might value 
humans more merely because they are humans. This is sometimes referred to as 
speciesism—a term from philosophy that frames our attitude to animals as a prejudice 
analogous to sexism or racism (Singer, 1975). In support of the speciesism 
hypothesis, studies have shown that factors such as the lesser mental capacities of 
animals play only a minor role in explaining our preference for humans (Caviola et al., 
2020). For example, in cases where humans with severe cognitive impairment have 
capacities equivalent to or even lower than some animals, people will nonetheless still 
prioritize those humans over animals. 
 The view that humans are morally more important is widespread and shapes law, 
policy, and behavior. However, the developmental trajectory of this view remains 
unclear. In this paper, we investigate whether children also prioritize humans over 
animals and explore potential explanatory mechanisms (e.g. perceived intelligence).  
We are not aware of any work that directly compares how children and adults 
morally prioritize animals relative to humans. Of the few studies that have explored 
children’s attitudes towards animals (see Melson, 2013), only two have systematically 
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investigated these intuitions in a developmental context. One study found that 4- to 
10-year-old children cared about an increasingly broad range of entities, including 
animals, as they grew older, but generally cared most for humans (Neldner et al., 
2018). Another study tracked how 4- to 10-year-old children perceive the moral worth 
of a range of living, non-living and artificial entities, including a dog and a child 
(Sommer et al., 2019), and found that children thought it was equally wrong to cause 
physical harm to a dog and a child, but they also thought that it was more wrong to 
give away a child than a dog. Thus, while the first study suggests that children might 
have a tendency to prioritize humans over animals, this second study suggests that 
their tendency is weaker than in adults.  
In order to fully investigate possible age differences in the tendency to prioritize 
humans over animals we compare children’s and adults’ responses to moral dilemmas 
which directly pit humans against dogs and pigs. In order to assess the moral value 
attributed to humans and animals, these dilemmas contrast varying numbers of 
humans against varying numbers of either dogs or pigs. Even if participants choose to 
save a single human over a single dog or pig, for instance, they may still regard the 
human as just slightly more valuable and hence would not favor a human over two 
animals. 
The present research 
In this project, children and adults were told to consider hypothetical scenarios 
where two boats and its passengers were sinking and that they had to choose which 
of the two boats they would rather save (They also had the option of not deciding). 
More specifically, across several dilemmas, participants were asked whether they 
would rather save 1, 2, 10 or 100 humans or 1, 2, 10, or 100 animals (dogs or pigs).  
Based on previous research on adults, we hypothesized that adults would 
prioritize humans even in cases where many more animals could be saved. By 
contrast, we hypothesized that children would have a weaker tendency than adults to 
prioritize humans over these animals. This hypothesis was driven by the findings of a 
previous study, discussed above, that showed that young children consider harm 
inflicted on a dog and on a child to be equally wrong (Sommer et al., 2019). 
Additionally, we hypothesized that both adults and children have a stronger 
tendency to prioritize humans over pigs than over dogs, since they value dogs—a 
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companion animal—more than pigs—a food animal (Bastian et al., 2012; Bratanova 
et al., 2011; Loughnan et al., 2010). Finally, in line with past research (Neldner et al., 
2018), we hypothesized that children’s tendency to prioritize humans over animals 
increases with age. 
Methods 
Open science 
Reports of all measures, manipulations, and exclusions, as well as all data, 
analysis code, and experimental materials are available for download at 
https://osf.io/24ewh/.  
Ethics statement 
For all studies, relevant ethical guidelines were followed, and the research was 
approved by the Yale University International Review Board and University of Oxford’s 
Central University Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Study 1a and 1b  
This study was pre-registered at https://osf.io/q43zk. 
Power Analysis. To obtain 80% power to detect a small to medium effect (f2 = 
.075) with an alpha of .05 in a linear multiple regression with six predictors (animal 
species, dog exposure, age, sex, sentience, intelligence) G*Power specifies a sample 
size of 189. To ensure that we were sufficiently powered, we aimed to collect 220 
participants.  
We recruited this sample for both adult and child populations. A priori power 
analysis for a 2 x 2 ANOVA with two groups (children vs. adults and two comparisons 
dogs vs. pigs) revealed that to obtain 80% power to detect a small-to-medium effect (f 
= .175) with an alpha of .05, a total sample size of 259 was required. As such, we are 




Study 1a (Children). We collected a total of 249 participants aged 5-9 yearsi. 
Participants were tested in a laboratory, a local museum, local schools, public parks 
and local festivals. The children tested in the laboratory were recruited from a list of 
parents who had previously agreed to participate. Results did not vary as a function 
of testing location. An additional 14 participants participated in the experiment but 
were not included: six due to experimenter error, two due to revoked consent, one 
due to inattention, and five because they were outside our predefined age rage. A 
further 28 were excluded because they failed the two comprehension check 
questions (plate and worms), leaving us with a final sample of 207 (89 female, Mage = 
7.71, SDage = 1.36). Of these, parents of 117 children opted to report their ethnicities 
(82% White/Caucasian; 8% Black/African American; 4% Asian; 2% Indian; 1% 
Hispanic; 5% reported mixed or multiple ethnicities). We also conducted all analyses 
without any exclusions (N = 240) and when excluding all participants who failed only 
one comprehension check question (N = 169). All key findings remained the same 
(see supplementary materials: https://osf.io/24ewh/.  
Study 1b (Adults). We recruited 224 US American participants online via MTurk. 
They received forty cents in payment (in line with US minimum wage) for their 
participation. Two were excluded for either failing the online attention check, or the two 
comprehension checks, leaving a final sample of 222 people (93 female, Mage = 37.24, 
SDage = 10.91). Sample size was determined by the same power analysis employed 
in the children experiment. Participants reported to have the following ethnicities 
(multiple selections were possible): 83% White/Caucasian; 8% Black/African 
American; 5% Asian; 1% Indian; 7% Hispanic; 2% other. Mean religiosity level was 
2.44 (SD = 2.08) on a scale from 1 (Not at all religious) to 7 (Extremely religious). 55% 
reported to have no religious affiliation, 32% reported to be Christians, and the 
remaining fraction reported to have another religion or belief. The mean political 
ideology score was 3.30 (SD = 1.78) on a scale from 1 (Very liberal) to 4 (Moderate) 
to 7 (Very conservative).  
Materials and Procedure. The experiment employed a within-subjects design 
such that all participants saw all questions.  
 
i We aimed to collect 220 children. However, because we collected data in group settings 
(museums, festivals) we ultimately ended up collecting an additional 29 participants. We opted to 
retain these to account for potential exclusion and to avoid wasting viable data.  
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Study 1a. Trained lab assistants collected the data. The survey was hosted on 
Qualtrics and all stimuli were presented on 10.2-inch iPads. A full copy of the survey, 
including all experimenter scripts, is provided in the supplementary materials. After 
written parental consent was obtained, participants were given the instructions for the 
study. They were told that two boats were sinking and that no one on either of the 
boats is able to swim, but that they could choose to save one boat. They were also 
told that if it was too hard to choose, they could pick a third option “can’t decide”.  
They subsequently completed a familiarization task (one bike vs. ten pens) with 
the same response options as the main task (save one bike, save ten pens, can’t 
decide). This was designed to ensure that children understood the conditions of the 
task. Once they had made their choice, the implications of their decision were 
explained to them (“you will save one bike, but you won’t save ten pens”) and they 
were given the opportunity to change their response as many times as they liked.  
After completing the familiarization task, participants completed the main 
comparisons. These were 18 comparisons of the same structure as the familiarization 
phase. These comparisons comprised three blocks. One block contained seven 
human vs. dog questions, another contained seven human vs. pig questions and the 
third contained four additional questions. The seven questions consisted of 1 human 
vs. 1 dog/pig (2 dogs/pigs, 10 dogs/pigs, 100 dogs/pigs) and 1 dog/pig vs. 1 human (2 
humans, 10 humans, 100 humans). The third block consisted of the following control 
questions: 1 human vs. 10 humans, 1 human vs. 10 worms, 1 human vs. 10 plates, 1 
dog vs. 1 pig. The purpose of these control questions was to rule out the possibility 
that children might merely select the larger number of entities, rather than engaging 
maturely with the dilemmas.  
The entity type and quantity varied for each comparison. The block presentation 
order, question presentation and comparison side (left vs. right) were all fully 
randomized. Note that in the studies the term ‘person’ (or ‘people’) was used instead 
of ‘human’ because we assumed this was easier for children to understand.  
After completing main comparisons, participants then completed capacity ratings 
for all three entities (human, dog, pig). All questions were presented in a randomized 
order, and the entities were randomized within each question type. The questions 
were: 1) How smart is a [x]? 2) How much can [x] feel physical pain? 3) How much 
can [x] feel sad and scared? Responses were on a scale of 1-4 (not at all, a little bit, 
a medium amount, a lot). Note that for the analysis we averaged perceived capacity 
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to experience physical pain and negative emotions to form a single ‘sentience’ score. 
After completion of the capacity ratings, parents were debriefed, and children were 
offered a prize as a thank you for participating (a small toy). Children tested in schools 
were not offered a reward.  
Justification of stimuli. This experiment involves providing children and adults 
with “tragic trade-off” dilemmas (Tetlock, 2003). This differs from past work, such as 
Neldner et al. (2018), which asks children how much they care about different entities. 
However, caring and moral status are distinct from each other. Here we are interested 
in moral status attribution, which is closely linked to preventing death and suffering. It 
is plausible, for example, that someone might dislike people and love animals, but still 
feel uncomfortable choosing to save a human over an animal. As such, we felt that 
trade-off dilemmas were best able to capture people’s intuitions about the moral status 
of different beings. Another reason is that trade-off dilemmas require people to directly 
compare between two options, which allows us to more precisely measure how many 
animals people think are worth one human. This sort of dilemma captures many real-
life zero-sum situations that we face as individuals or society (e.g. where to direct our 
limited resources). By contrast, the independent ratings used in past work (Neldner et 
al., 2018) allow participants assign high moral worth to all entities.   
We chose dogs because they are a highly valued animal (see Neldner et al., 2018) 
and would provide a strong test of children’s speciesist tendencies. We chose pigs 
because they are comparable to dogs in many ways (size, behavior, intelligence) but 
are categorized as a food animal and generally granted less moral status (Caviola & 
Capraro, 2020). 
We purposefully chose abstract categories of individuals (“human”, “dog”, “pig”), 
following the standard practice in this sort of research. (Crimston et al., 2016; Greene 
et al., 2001; Hester & Gray, 2020; Neldner et al., 2018; Schein, 2020). Future research 
could investigate the possible effects of more specific characterizations. It is possible 
that both adults and children would respond differently if the individuals were described 
in more concrete terms. Research into “identifiable victim” effects (Kogut & Ritov, 
2011), for example, suggests that we value individuals more if they are given names. 
It is possible that such an effect would be stronger for humans than for dogs or pigs, 
and hence might lead children to behave more similarly to adults, valuing humans 
more. Further, we would expect participants to be sensitive to historical and social 
information about the individuals in question. Many adults, we suspect, would rather 
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save a puppy than save a boat with ten serial killers on it. A lot of children would 
probably save a boat with their mother on it than a boat with any number of animals 
on it. Further, it’s possible that children would prioritize humans over animals more if 
the humans at stake were children as well, either because they perceive them as peers 
or as more vulnerable than adults (cf. Goodwin & Landy, 2013). 
Study 1b. This experiment was almost identical to Study 1a, with the only 
difference that adult participants completed the task online and read the task 
themselves, rather than having an experimenter administer the task. Adults also 
indicated their income, education and political orientation. 
Study 2a and 2b  
This study was pre-registered at https://osf.io/8twbs. 
Power Analysis. To obtain 80% power to detect a medium effect (f = .28) with an 
alpha of .05, df of 1 and 2 groups (children and adults), a total sample size of 103 was 
required (i.e., 52 per group). Since we did not plan to conduct a regression analysis 
as in Study 1, the required sample size was much smaller. In order to account for 
exclusions, we aimed to recruit 65 participants per group. 
Participants.  
Study 2a (Children). We collected a total of 83 participants aged 7-9 years. Six 
were excluded due to experimenter error, two due to technical issues, one due to 
parental interference, nine because they were outside our age range, and four 
because they failed the two comprehension check questions (plate and worms), 
leaving us with a final sample of 61 (31 female, Mage = 7.89, SDage = 0.82). Of these, 
parents of 30 children opted to report their ethnicity (66% White/Caucasian; 13% 
Black/African American; 1% Asian; 0.3% Hispanic; and 0.6% reported mixed or 
multiple ethnicities. Children were again tested and recruited by trained research 
assistants in a dedicated testing lab, at a local museum, local schools and public parks. 
Again, testing location did not influence results.  
Study 2b (Adults). We recruited 66 US American participants online via MTurk. 
They received thirty-six cents in payment (in line with US minimum wage) for their 
participation. Two were excluded for either failing the online attention check, or the two 
comprehension checks, leaving a final sample of 64 people (23 female, Mage = 35, 
SDage = 1.90). Participants reported to have the following ethnicities (multiple 
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selections were possible): 88% White/Caucasian; 8% Black/African American; 6% 
Asian; 2% Indian; 2% Hispanic; 0% other. Mean religiosity level was 2.27 (SD = 1.86) 
on a scale from 1 (Not at all religious) to 7 (Extremely religious). 63% reported to have 
no religious affiliation, 31% reported to be Christians, and the remaining fraction 
reported to have another religion or belief. The mean political ideology score was 2.86 
(SD = 1.88) on a scale from 1 (Very liberal) to 4 (Moderate) to 7 (Very conservative).  
 
Materials and Procedure. We had the same materials and procedure as in Study 
1 with two exceptions. First, instead of being asked about their own preferences, 
participants were introduced to a character “Mr. X”, who always does the right thing. 
They were then asked to report which boat they thought Mr. X would save in each 
scenario.  
Second, we omitted the mental capacity questions. We did this for two reasons. 
First, because we were interested in determining whether the overall finding was 
representative of preferences or moral judgements, and thus we were not focused on 
predicting attitudes. Second, with the smaller sample for the second study we would 
have been insufficiently powered to accurately identify such predictors.   
Analyses  
For the statistical analyses we calculated two scores per participant: a humans-over-
dogs bias score and a humans-over-pigs bias score. The scores were calculated as 
follows: each participant received certain points for each dilemma depending on their 
choice; these points were aggregated per participant. The point scoring system was 
based on the function log2(2x) where x stands for the larger number of beings of the 
respective dilemma. This would ensure that the scores were weighted by the numbers 
of beings at stake in the dilemma, but not so much that the dilemmas involving higher 
number of beings completely dominated the score. For example, it meant that 
prioritizing one person over 100 dogs contributed more to the humans-over-dogs score 
than prioritizing one human over 10 dogs, but not ten times more. The maximum score 
(absolute prioritization of humans) was 14.96 and the minimum score -14.96. A score 
of zero meant the participants attributed the same moral status to both types of beings. 




Study 1a and 1b 
In this study, we presented both children and adults with the same set of moral 
prioritization dilemmas. We found that children had a much weaker tendency to 
prioritize humans over animals than adults did (Figure 1). For example, while 71% of 
children prioritized 100 dogs over 1 human, 61% of adults prioritized 1 human over 
100 dogs. The 1 vs. 1 dilemmas were particularly revealing: 35% of children prioritized 
one human over one dog, 28% of children prioritized one dog over one human, and 
the rest couldn’t decide. In contrast, 85% of adults prioritized one human over one dog 
and only 8% prioritized the dog. 18% of children prioritized one pig over one human, 
57% prioritized one human over one pig, and the rest couldn’t decide. In contrast, 93% 






Figure 1. Percentages of either children or adult participants who prioritized the 
humans, the animals (dogs or pigs), or couldn’t decide. (Study 1) 
 
Based on the responses across the seven dilemmas, we calculated a humans-
over-dogs and humans-over-pigs bias score for each participant. The higher the score, 
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the stronger the tendency to prioritize the human over the respective animal species. 
Children had a mean humans-over-dogs bias score of 0.24 (SD = 6.66) and a humans-
over-pigs bias score of 4.58 (SD = 6.41). Adults had a mean humans-over-dogs bias 
score of 9.89 (SD = 7.47) and a humans-over-pigs score of 12.3 (SD = 5.43). A one-
sample t-test showed that children’s humans-over-dogs bias score was not statistically 
higher than zero, t(206) = 0.52, p = .60, d = .04, 95% CI [-.10, .17], suggesting that, 
on average, children tend not to prioritize humans over dogs. Children’s humans-over-
pigs bias score (t(206) = 10.26, p < .001, d = .71, 95% CI [.56, .87]) as well as both 
adults’ humans-over-dogs bias score (t(222) = 19.77, p < .001, d = 1.32, 95% CI [1.15, 
1.52]) and humans-over-pigs bias score (t(222) = 33.82, p < .001, d = 2.26, 95% CI 
[2.05, 2.56]) were all statistically above zero, suggesting that children do prioritize 
humans over pigs and adults prioritize humans over both dogs and pigs. 
A mixed ANOVA 2 (group: children vs. adults) x 2 (species: pig vs. dog) revealed 
2 main effects and an interaction. Children had a weaker tendency to prioritize humans 
over animals than adults, F(1, 426) = 239.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .36, 95% CI  [.29, .42]. 
Both children and adults had a stronger tendency to prioritize humans over pigs than 
over dogs, F(1, 428) = 143.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .26, 95% CI  [.19, .32]. The difference 
in bias scores was greater for children than for adults, F(1, 428) = 11.85, p < .001, ηp2 
= .03, 95% CI  [.01, .06]. This interaction effect, however, could simply be the result of 
there being a ceiling effect in adults, i.e., their scores were close to the maximum score 
for both pigs and dogs. 
Figure 2 shows that children and adults had similar perceptions about the 
intelligence and sentience levels of humans, dogs and pigs. They both perceived 
humans to be more intelligent than dogs and dogs to be more intelligent than pigs. 
Similarly, they both perceived humans to be more sentient than dogs and dogs to be 
more sentient than pigs. Notably, the differences in perceived intelligence and 
sentience for these beings were of similar degree in adults and children. Yet, despite 
this, children and adults gave different moral judgements, suggesting that perceived 





Figure 2. Children and adults’ mean ratings of intelligence (1) and sentience (2) for 
humans, dogs, and pigs. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
To explore potential explanatory mechanisms, we conducted a linear regression using 
the bias scores as an outcome variable and with species (dog vs. pig), age, gender, 
perceived intelligence, perceived sentience, and regular dog (pet) exposure as 
predictor variables. This was conducted separately for the child and adult sample. 
Note that we subtracted perceived intelligence and sentience score for the animals 
from the perceived intelligence and sentience scores of humans for each participant, 
producing a perceived difference in intelligence/sentience score. The results showed 
that species, perceived intelligence and dog exposure were significant predictors in 
both the children and adult sample (Table 1), while gender and perceived sentience 
were not. Age was predictive in the adult sample, but not the child sample.  
Against our hypothesis, there was neither a significant correlation between age 
and humans-over-dogs bias scores (r = .12, p = .07) nor between age and humans-
over-pigs bias score (r = .04, p = .59) for children. In adults, however, age correlated 
positively with humans-over-dogs bias scores (r = .17, p = .01) but not with humans-
over-pigs bias scores (r = .09, p = .21). 
Children who had regular exposure to dogs (45%) had a lower bias in favor of 
humans over dogs (M = -2.26, SD = 6.23) than children without exposure (M = 2.40, 
SD = 6.37), t(198) = 5.28, p < .001, d = .74, 95% CI  [.45, 1.03]. Similarly, children with 
dog exposure had a lower bias in favor of humans over pigs (M = 3.02, SD = 6.52) 
than children without exposure (M = 5.95, SD = 6.10), t(192) = 3.29, p = .001, d = .47, 
95% CI  [.18, .75]. Adults who had regular exposure to dogs (69%) also had a lower 
bias in favor of humans over dogs (M = 9.10, SD = 7.93) than adults without exposure 
(M = 11.83, SD = 5.86), t(173) = 2.86, p = .005, d = .37, 95% CI  [.08, .66]. Adults with 
dog exposure did not have a significantly lower bias in favor of humans over pigs (M 
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= 11.83, SD = 5.86) than adults without exposure (M = 13.14, SD = 4.16), t(178) = 
1.65, p = .10, d = .21, 95% CI  [-.08, .50]. 
We found that the pattern of results remains even when we excluded children who 
seemed to merely pick larger numbers in control questions (e.g., children who picked 
10 plates over 1 human). This suggests that the effect cannot be explained merely as 
a bias in children for choosing the larger number. Moreover, children had a much 
weaker tendency to prioritize humans over animals than adults even in dilemmas that 
pitted one human against one dog or pig, i.e., when the numbers on both sides were 
the same. This further supports the hypothesis that children have a weaker tendency 
to prioritize humans over animals than adults. 
 
 
Table 1. Linear regression predicting bias scores 
 Children Adults 
Species 49.13***  15.96*** 
Age 1.02 5.31* 
Gender 1.00 0.94 
Perceived Intelligence 9.52** 26.19*** 
Perceived Sentience 1.96  3.43† 
Regular dog (pet) 
exposure 
19.15*** 3.92* 
Note. F values. † p < .10.  * p < .05.  ** p < .01.   *** p < .001.  
 
 
Study 2a and 2b 
This study aimed to replicate the effects found in the first study. However, instead 
of asking participants how they personally would decide in the moral dilemmas, we 
asked them how they think a person who always does the morally right thing would 
decide. This would allow us to rule out the possibility that children’s responses in the 
first study represented their personal preferences, rather than their views about what 







Figure 3. Percentages of either children or adult participants who prioritized the 
humans, the animals (dogs or pigs), or couldn’t decide. (Study 2) 
 
The pattern of results was similar to that of Study 1 (Figure 3). Children had a 
mean humans-over-dogs bias score of 1.74 (SD = 6.16) and a humans-over-pigs bias 
score of 5.15 (SD = 5.65). Adults had a mean humans-over-dogs bias score of 10.66 
(SD = 6.47) and a humans-over-pigs score of 12.02 (SD = 5.10). One-sample t-tests 
showed that children’s humans-over-dogs bias score (t(60) = 2.20, p = .03, d = .28, 
95% CI [.03, .54] as well as their humans-over-pigs bias score (t(60) = 7.13, p < .001, 
d = .91, 95% CI [.61, 1.21]) were significantly above zero. The same was the case for 
adults’ humans-over-dogs bias score (t(63) = 13.19, p < .001, d = 1.65, 95% CI [1.27, 
2.03]) and adults’ humans-over-pigs bias score (t(63) = 18.85, p < .001, d = 2.36, 95% 
CI [1.87, 2.84]). This suggests that both children and adults tended to prioritize 
humans over dogs and pigs. 
We found that children had a slightly weaker tendency to prioritize humans over 
animals in Study 1 than in Study 2. It is possible that this tendency is slightly more 
reflected in their personal preferences (Study 1) than in their beliefs about what is 
morally right (Study 2) or what they think adults think is right. Note, however, that the 
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discrepancy was minimal and may merely be fortuitous, given the relatively small 
sample size of Study 2. 
A mixed ANOVA 2 (group: children vs. adults) x 2 (species: pig vs. dog) revealed 
2 main effects and no interaction. Children had a weaker tendency to prioritize humans 
over animals than adults, F(1,121) = 72.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .37, 95% CI [.24, .48]. Both 
children and adults had a stronger tendency to prioritize humans over pigs than over 
dogs, F(1, 124) = 23.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .16, 95% CI [.05, .27]. There was an interaction 
effect between group and species, F(1, 124) = 4.42, p = .04, ηp2 = .05, 95% CI [.0, 
.11].  
Again, there was neither a significant correlation between age and humans-over-
dogs bias scores (r = .09, p = .47) nor between age and humans-over-pigs bias score 
(r = -.07, p = .60) for children. In adults, however, age correlated positively with 
humans-over-dogs bias scores (r = .36, p = .003) and with humans-over-pigs bias 
scores (r = .37, p = .003). 
Children who had regular exposure to dogs (68%) had a lower (marginally sign.) 
bias in favor of humans over dogs (M = 0.78, SD = 5.80) than children without 
exposure (M = 4.25, SD = 6.66), t(26) = 1.89, p = .07, d = .57, 95% CI [-.03, 1.16]. 
However, children with dog exposure did not have a lower bias in favor of humans 
over pigs (M = 5.53, SD = 5.43) than children without exposure (M = 4.32, SD = 6.39), 
t(26) = -0.68, p = .50, d = .21, 95% CI [-.36, .77]. Adults who had regular exposure to 
dogs (55%) did not have a significantly lower bias in favor of humans over dogs (M = 
9.69, SD = 7.15) than adults without exposure (M = 11.84, SD = 5.42), t(62) = 1.36, p 
= .18, d = .33, 95% CI [-.17, .83]. Similarly, adults with dog exposure did not have a 
significantly lower bias in favor of humans over pigs (M = 11.61, SD = 4.98) than adults 
without such exposure (M = 12.51, SD = 2.29), t(58) = 0.69, p = .49, d = .17, 95% CI 
[-.32, .67]. 
Discussion 
To our knowledge, this is the first project to directly and systematically compare 
the degree to which children and adults prioritize humans over animals in moral 
dilemmas. Across two studies we found that children between the age of 5 and 9 have 
a weaker tendency to prioritize humans over dogs and pigs than adults. This is 
expressed in both their own preferences (Study 1) and in their beliefs about what is 
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morally correct (Study 2). In both studies, the majority of children said they would save 
multiple dogs over one human. And in 1 vs. 1 scenarios, many opted to save the dog, 
or couldn’t decide. Children did tend to prioritize humans over pigs, but this tendency 
was weaker than that of adults. In contrast to our predictions, however, we did not find 
any age-related changes in children’s judgements: children from 5-9 years all tended 
to value animals far more than adults did.  
We found that regular exposure to dogs had a strong impact on their tendency to 
prioritize humans. Children with such background valued dogs much more than those 
without it. In Study 1, but not Study 2, dog exposure also predicted children’s tendency 
to prioritize humans over pigs. 
In Study 1, we found that the extent to which participants perceived dogs and pigs 
as less intelligent predicted the extent to which they prioritized humans. By contrast, 
levels of sentience did not predict moral judgments. Notably, we found that even 
though adults and children attributed roughly the same absolute and relative levels of 
intelligence and sentience to humans, dogs, and pigs, their moral judgments were 
strikingly different. This suggests that factors other than intelligence or sentience 
underpin these moral judgments. 
Previous studies suggest that adults exhibit speciesism (Caviola et al., 2019). For 
example, adults prioritize humans even in cases where humans have equal or lower 
cognitive capacities than animals (Caviola et al., 2020). Thus, one possible 
explanation of our findings is that children are far less speciesist than adults. While we 
found that children weakly prioritize humans over dogs and pigs, we do not know 
whether this is because of speciesism or because of other factors, such as the belief 
that humans have more sophisticated cognitive capacities or that they experience 
more happiness over their lifetimes than dogs or pigs do.  
What are the origins of this tendency? One possibility is that it is an unlearned 
preference. For much of human history, animals played a central role in human life—
whether as a threat or as a resource. It therefore seems possible that humans would 
develop distinctive psychological mechanisms for thinking about animals. Even if there 
are no specific cognitive adaptations for thinking about animals, it is hardly surprising 
that humans prefer humans over animals; similar to their preference for tribe members 
over strangers. Similarly, given that in-group favoritism in human groups (e.g. racism, 
sexism, minimal groups) tends to emerge as early as preschool years (Buttelmann & 
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Böhm, 2014), one would expect that a basic tendency to prioritize humans over 
animals also emerges early.  
But we would suggest that the much stronger tendency to prioritize humans over 
animals in adults has a different source, and, given the lack of correlation between 
age and speciesism in children, one that emerges late in development. Adolescents 
may learn and internalize the socially-held ‘speciesist’ notion—or ideology—that 
humans are morally special and deserve full moral status, while animals do not. While 
ideas and practices reflecting strong speciesism are widespread, these may not be as 
salient to young children from urban backgrounds in developed countries, to whom 
animals are largely presented in a highly positive and anthropomorphized form. Most 
young children have no direct experience, and often no knowledge, of the practices 
relating to, e.g., meat production or animal experimentation. It is possible that strong 
speciesist beliefs emerge only when these practices become more salient, during 
adolescence (at least in Western cultures). Thus, the strong form of speciesism 
exhibited in adults may be a socially acquired ideology. 
The hypothesis that speciesism is at least partly a socially acquired ideology could 
also explain why there are different cultural manifestations of speciesism, e.g., in 
certain cultures people eat dogs while others consider cows holy. It could also explain 
why in our studies older adults had a stronger tendency to prioritize humans over 
animals than younger adults. This could be a reflection of a generational shift in 
attitudes to animal welfare, perhaps partly influenced by the animal rights movement 
that emerged in the 1970s (Singer, 1975). While today many people are opposed to 
unnecessary animal cruelty (Vaughn et al., 2009), historically that was not always the 
norm (Kelch, 2012; Pinker, 2011) 
Further research is required to explore the origins of speciesism. Such research 
could explore when attitudes shift in adolescence from a weak to a strong tendency to 
prioritize humans over animals. Or whether the strong form of speciesism exhibited in 
adults emerges earlier in cultures where younger children have more direct exposure 
to instrumental uses of animals.  
Our study provides initial evidence that children prioritize humans less over 
animals than adults do. However, there are limits to the generalizability of our findings. 
One is that, for reasons given earlier, we chose to look at dogs and pigs. People may 
respond differently when asked about different animals, such as smaller or scarier 
ones, or those that are more human-like, such as chimpanzees. Similarly, our subjects 
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may have responded differently if the individuals at stake were specified in more detail. 
Another limitation is that our sample was primarily Caucasian, English-speaking and 
recruited from urban areas. Given the apparent social learning mechanisms, it is 
possible that children from different backgrounds may respond differently. Another 
limitation is the use of purely hypothetical dilemmas, rather than real life choices. More 
research is needed to test the extent to which our finding generalizes across 
participant populations, moral contexts, and types of beings at stake in both 
experimental tasks and in real-life behavior.  
 To sum up, our research suggests that young children are far less speciesist 
than adults, at least in the context of dogs and pigs. Across two studies, children as 
old as 9 years prioritized humans to a far lesser extent than adults did, who almost 
always chose to save humans. This indicates that speciesism may emerge late in 
development. This challenges the notion that the tendency to morally prioritize humans 
is a completely ingrained moral intuition, unrelated to social norms. Instead, our 
findings suggest that, while a general bias in favor of humans may be present in young 
children, the strong speciesist view held by adults may be socially acquired and, thus, 
potentially malleable. It is possible, in particular, that strong speciesism would not be 
as pervasive in a cultural context where, for example, vegetarianism is much more 
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